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INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE NEGOTIATIONS:
OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR
THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION
DAVID B. HUNTER†
Although many important environmental issues face President
Obama, none is as critical or complex as climate change. Climate
change will dominate the early environmental policies of the Obama
Administration, not only because of its vital importance, but also
because of a confluence of national and international politics. First,
the Bush Administration took a number of administrative actions in
its last year aimed at curtailing domestic response to climate change,
and the Obama Administration will look to reverse them or minimize
their impacts.1 Even without new legislation, President Obama will
have many opportunities to address climate change under existing
2
statutes and within existing agency mandates. Secondly, the newly
strengthened Democratic majority in the U.S. Congress has made
climate change a priority and has been holding hearings on a new
comprehensive climate change bill.
Finally, international

†

David Hunter is Associate Professor at the American University Washington College of Law
and a Member Scholar with the Center for Progressive Reform. The author would like to thank
Skye Bougsty-Marshall and Rowan Smith for their excellent research assistance and Dean
Claudio Grossman for his support for this research.
1. See, e.g., Memorandum from Stephen Johnson, Adm’r, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, to
Reg’l Adm’rs on EPA’s Interpretation of Regulations that Determine Pollutants Covered by
Federal Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) Permit Program (Dec. 18, 2008)
(prohibiting the denial of permits under the Clean Air Act on the basis of concerns over CO2
emissions); Interagency Cooperation under the Endangered Species Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 76,272
(Dec. 16, 2008) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 402) (weakening the scientific basis for
interagency consultation and changing the definition of indirect cumulative effects); California
State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards, Notice of Decision Denying a Waiver of
Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s 2009 and Subsequent Model Year Greenhouse Gas
Emission Standards for New Motor Vehicles, 73 Fed. Reg. 12,156 (Mar. 6, 2008).
2. See REBECCA M. BRATSPIES ET AL., CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, WHITE PAPER
No. 906, PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT BY THE STROKE OF A
PRESIDENTIAL PEN (2008), available at http://www.progressivereform.org/CPR_ExecOrders_
Stroke_of_a_Pen.pdf (proposing several new executive orders for safeguarding the
environment, including orders to require federal agencies to evaluate the climate change-related
implications of their actions under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and to
require each federal agency to measure, report, and reduce its carbon footprint).
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negotiations on the post-Kyoto climate regime are scheduled to be
completed by the end of 2009.3 Administratively, legislatively, and
internationally, the Obama Administration will have unprecedented
opportunities to develop a comprehensive, long-term strategy for
responding to climate change. This article is limited to a discussion of
the international dimensions of climate change policy facing the new
Administration, although the international dimensions will
undoubtedly be shaped substantially by progress (or the lack of it) on
the domestic administrative and legislative fronts.
I. BACKGROUND TO THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE
NEGOTIATIONS
The first challenge for the Administration in international
climate policy is really one of timing. The United States is a party to
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),4
signed in 1992, but is not a party to the subsequent 1997 Kyoto
5
Protocol. That protocol was famously repudiated by President Bush
in 2001 and entered into force without U.S. participation.6 Under the
Kyoto Protocol, the European Union and other industrialized
countries have agreed to reduce their greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions on average by five percent below 1990 levels.7 These
reductions are to be achieved during the years 2008–2012, known as
8
the first reporting period.

3. See Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, Bali, Indon., Dec. 3–15, 2007, Report of the Conference of the Parties—
Addendum, Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at its Thirteenth Session,
dec. 1/CP.13, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2007/6/Add.1 (Mar. 14, 2008), available at http://unfccc.int/
resource/docs/2007/cop13/eng/06a01.pdf [hereinafter Bali Action Plan]; US Sets Terms for
Climate Talks, BBC NEWS, Dec. 15, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/7145608.stm.
4. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771
U.N.T.S. 107, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf [hereinafter
UNFCCC].
5. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
Dec. 11, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf
[hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
6. UN’s Kyoto Treaty Against Global Warming Comes Into Force, UN NEWS SERV., Feb.
16, 2005, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=13359&Cr=global&Cr1=warm; Bush
Firm over Kyoto Stance, CNN.COM, Mar. 29, 2001, http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/03/29/
schroeder.bush/index.html.
7. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 5, art. 3, ¶ 1. See generally MICHAEL GRUBB ET AL., THE
KYOTO PROTOCOL: A GUIDE AND ASSESSMENT (1999) (providing a general overview of the
Kyoto Protocol).
8. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 5, art. 3, ¶ 1.
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Anticipating that the first reporting period would soon be
drawing to a close, the parties to the Framework Convention
9
negotiated the so-called Bali Road Map in 2007. The Bali Road Map
is comprised of several forward-looking decisions, including (1) a
timetable with a 2009 deadline for negotiating further commitments
of those parties (called Annex I Parties) that have adopted a cap on
emissions under the Kyoto Protocol,10 (2) a decision operationalizing
the Adaptation Fund that had been created under the Kyoto Protocol
11
and was viewed as critical for developing countries, (3) a
compromise on what to include in the review of the adequacy of the
Kyoto Protocol as required under Article 9,12 and (4) the Bali Action
13
Plan. The Bali Action Plan sets out an ambitious framework for
negotiating a post-Kyoto agreement with binding commitments on all
parties. The parties, including the United States and most other
major countries in the world, agreed to launch a “comprehensive
process” for achieving a “shared vision for long-term cooperative
action, including a long-term global goal for emission reductions.”14
These negotiations are structured under an “Ad Hoc Working Group
on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWGLCA).” The Bali Action Plan further enumerates a number of topics
for “consideration,” including:
(i) Measurable, reportable and verifiable nationally appropriate
mitigation commitments or actions, including quantified emission
limitation and reduction objectives, by all developed country
Parties, while ensuring the comparability of efforts among them,
taking into account differences in their national circumstances;

9. See Rachmat Witoelar, President, U.N. Climate Change Conference, Address to
Closing Plenary at Closing of the Joint High-Level Segment: The Bali Road Map (Dec. 15,
2007), available at http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_13/application/pdf/close_stat_cop13_
president.pdf.
10. See Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitment for Annex I Parties under the
Kyoto Protocol, Fourth Session, Bali, Indon., Dec. 3–15, 2007, Report of the Ad Hoc Working
Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol, ¶ 22, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/KP/AWG/2007/5 (Feb. 5, 2008).
11. Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol,
Bali, Indon., Dec. 3–15, 2007, Report of the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of
the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its Third Session—Addendum, Part Two: Action Taken by
the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol at its
Third Session, dec. 1/CMP.3, U.N. Doc FCCC/KP/CMP/2007/9/Add.1 (Mar. 14, 2008), available
at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2007/cmp3/eng/09a01.pdf [hereinafter Adaptation Fund].
12. See id. dec. 4/CMP.3.
13. See Bali Action Plan, supra note 3.
14. Id. dec. 1/CP.13(a).
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(ii) Nationally appropriate mitigation actions by developing
country Parties in the context of sustainable development,
supported and enabled by technology, financing and capacity15
building, in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner . . . .

Through this language, all developed countries (including the
United States) agreed to negotiate “measurable, reportable and
verifiable” commitments that would include further binding caps on
emissions. For their part, all developing countries (including China
and India) agreed to negotiate “actions” to reduce the threat of
climate change that would be nationally appropriate, consistent with
goals of sustainable development, and in a “measurable, reportable
and verifiable” manner. The developing countries did not commit to
negotiating caps on emissions, but did commit to negotiations over
taking actions of some indeterminate nature. Other provisions in the
Bali Action Plan committed the parties to negotiate positive
incentives for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest
degradation in developing countries,16 enhanced actions for
17
18
adaptation, technology development and transfer, and international
19
financial support for responding to climate change.
The Bali Action Plan committed both the United States and
developing countries to negotiating a post-Kyoto agreement with
some form of binding—or at least measurable, reportable, and
verifiable—commitments. Under the terms of the Bali Action Plan,
the agreement is to be finalized at a Conference of the Parties of the
UNFCCC in December 2009 in Copenhagen. The issue of timing
quickly becomes apparent. The last major negotiating session
occurred in December 2008 in Poznan, Poland. Smaller interim
negotiations are scheduled between Poland and Copenhagen, but this
gives little time for a new Administration to shape its international
climate policy and promote that policy effectively in the international
negotiations.
As then President-elect Obama said repeatedly, “there is only
one President of the United States at a time,” and the U.S.
negotiating team in Poznan was still led by the disinterested Bush

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. dec. 1/CP.13(b)(i)–(ii).
Id. dec. 1/CP.13(b)(iii).
Id. dec. 1/CP.13(c).
Id. dec. 1/CP.13(d).
Id. dec. 1/CP.13(e).
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Administration. 20 Despite a grassroots effort launched to convince
President-elect Obama to attend the Poznan negotiations, he wisely
21
demurred and indeed did not send any high-level delegation at all.
Elected only in November, Obama had little time to form a team of
representatives for the Poznan meeting and, in any event, would have
had no formal role in the negotiations.
Although he refused to send a team to Poznan, President-elect
Obama did send a clear signal to the negotiators in a highly
publicized, taped message sent to the Global Climate Summit
convened by California Governor Schwarzenegger two weeks before
22
the beginning of the Poznan negotiations. There, President-elect
Obama reiterated his campaign pledges to “engage vigorously” in
international climate negotiations and to reassert U.S. leadership in
combating climate change.23 Specifically, he endorsed federal capand-trade legislation with goals of reducing current emissions to 1990
levels by 2020, and eighty percent reductions from 1990 levels by
2050.24 He also promised an investment of $15 billion a year in
shifting the U.S. toward a clean energy future—albeit one apparently
premised in part on nuclear power and clean coal technology.25
Although these goals may be both scientifically insufficient
(particularly the mid-term 2020 goal) and economically infeasible,26
the Obama speech clearly signaled a dramatic change in the U.S.

20. See, e.g., Juliet Eilperin, Transition’s Timing Hits Climate Talks, WASH. POST, Dec. 8,
2008, at A2, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/12/07/
AR2008120702426.html.
21. Id.
22. Streaming Video: President-Elect Barack Obama, Address to the Global Climate
Summit: A New Chapter on Climate Change (Nov. 17, 2008), available at http://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=hvG2XptIEJk [hereinafter Obama Climate Speech].
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. U.S. emissions are now over fifteen percent higher than 1990 levels. See ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, REP. NO. DOE/EIA-0573(2007), EMISSIONS OF
GREENHOUSE GASES IN THE UNITED STATES 2007, at 1 tbl.1 (2008), available at http://
www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/ggrpt/pdf/0573(2007).pdf. Given emissions growth in the United
States, some European negotiators are particularly concerned that the United States not be
allowed to use a different set of baselines than those that form the basis for Kyoto or otherwise
benefit from its delay in reducing emissions. See Louise Van Schaik & Karel Van Hecke,
Skating on Thin Ice: Europe’s Internal Climate Policy and Its Position in the World 8–9 (Egmont
Royal Inst. for Int’l Relations, Working Paper No. 2008/12); Press Release, Council of the
European Union, 2898th Council Meeting: Environment (Oct. 20, 2008), available at
http://www.eulib.com/2898th-council-meeting-environment-luxembourg-2008-2972 (underlining
“the importance of . . . a clear reference to 1990 as the base year”).
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approach to climate negotiations. President-elect Obama confirmed
that the climate change science was “beyond dispute” and that delay
27
and denial were no longer options from Washington. Moreover,
Obama appears to be surrounding himself with knowledgeable
people committed to combating climate change. Particularly the
selections of Dr. Stephen Chu to head the Department of Energy, Dr.
John Holdren as Science Advisor, and Dr. Jane Lubchenco to head
up the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration suggest a
new and real commitment to science-based policymaking around
climate change.28
Through these steps, the President has begun to meet what may
be the most important short-term challenge in international climate
negotiations—not only must the Administration recommit the United
States to an aggressive, multilateral approach to address climate
change, but it must also convince the world that the U.S. commitment
is both long-term and serious. Much of the rest of the world is
waiting for the United States to engage more directly and more
constructively in an international effort to address climate change.
Europe, particularly, will welcome this effort, but will understandably
remain somewhat skeptical until President Obama’s rhetoric is
matched by real positions put on the table. The United States must
recognize that it has been rightly viewed as an obstacle to global
climate policy for the last eight years, if not longer.
The types of proposals and approaches the Obama
Administration actually puts on the table in the negotiations will
signal how serious the United States is about climate change. Climate
change is a complex issue that extends to virtually all aspects of
foreign and domestic public policy, including not only environmental
policy, but also agricultural, transportation, and energy policies.
Rather than trying to address the entire field of issues implicated by
climate change, the rest of this article will address six interrelated
issues vital to the success of the current climate negotiations: (1) the
level of U.S. targets in the post-Kyoto regime; (2) the nature and level
of developing country commitments in such a regime; (3) the amount
and structure of international financial assistance; (4) the treatment of
forests, particularly efforts to curb deforestation; (5) the approaches
to adaptation or measures to be taken to reduce the impact of climate

27. Obama Climate Speech, supra note 22.
28. Deborah Zabarenko, Obama Team Primed to Push Climate Change Agenda,
REUTERS, Dec. 22, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/vcCandidateFeed2/idUSN22505340.
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change; and (6) the future of the market mechanisms, particularly the
clean development mechanism. The article ends with recommended
steps the Administration should take in international climate policy
outside of the post-Kyoto negotiations.
II. U.S. COMMITMENTS IN A POST-KYOTO AGREEMENT
The United States needs to embrace generally the cap-and-trade
structure of the Kyoto Protocol, if for no other reason than to
continue the momentum built during implementation of Kyoto. The
parties to Kyoto, particularly in Europe, have invested considerable
resources and time in developing the carbon market, and the United
States will rightly be viewed suspiciously if we oppose the basic
structure of cap-and-trade. As suggested below, supporting the capand-trade structure does not mean that every step taken
internationally to address climate change needs to fit within the capand-trade system.
What then should the U.S. cap look like? To assure the world
that we are serious about addressing climate change, the United
States must be willing to take difficult and possibly costly steps at
home to reduce our emissions, just as the other countries have begun
to do within the Kyoto framework. The U.S. commitment needs to
meet several criteria.
First, the US commitment must be
commensurate with those commitments being made by the European
Union and other Annex I countries. Not only has the European
Union taken actions under Kyoto, but it has promised deeper
commitments in a post-Kyoto regime. The European Union has
suggested a twenty percent emissions reduction from 1990 levels by
2020 if there is no post-Kyoto agreement, and as much as a thirty
percent reduction if there is agreement.29 Some countries have
suggested even deeper cuts; the United Kingdom, for example, has
enacted legislation to cut greenhouse gas emissions twenty-six percent
by 2020 and eighty percent by 2050.30
29. See EU Reveals Energy Plan of Action, BBC NEWS, Jan. 23, 2008, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/7203514.stm (detailing the European Union’s commitment
to cut its greenhouse gas emissions by twenty percent by 2020, and potentially by up to thirty
percent if a global agreement is reached to more equitably distribute the attendant burden).
30. See Richard Black, UK: Climate Pioneer?, BBC NEWS EARTH WATCH, http://
www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/thereporters/richardblack/2008/11 (Nov. 27, 2008, 14:12 GMT) (reporting
that the enactment of the Climate Change Bill will make the UK the first nation to create
domestic, legally binding carbon emissions reduction targets commensurate with the cuts
recommended by the IPCC, by mandating reductions of greenhouse gas emissions of twenty-six
percent by 2020 and eighty percent by 2050).
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Any U.S. proposal to the international negotiations has to be
within a similar range to be politically credible. The question remains
whether Obama’s announced interim goal of returning to 1990 levels
by 2020 is deemed to be sufficient. While welcoming the U.S. longterm goal of cutting emissions eighty percent by 2050, an amount
identical to Europe’s commitments, the other parties may demand
more interim progress from the United States.31 The interim goal is
far below what is being promoted by the European leaders, and in
2020 would still place the United States below the current obligations
of Annex I parties under the Kyoto Protocol.32 The interim target
raises concerns that the United States may put off major changes
needed for the long term, leaving the more difficult political choices
to a future Administration that may or may not be serious about
avoiding climate change. As a starting point for negotiations,
however, Obama’s announced position at least suggests that the
United States will be a constructive player in the ensuing
negotiations. One possible outcome is that the United States agrees
to additional interim commitments for 2030 or 2040 that bind it to
make progress along the way to 2050.33
The second criterion (which is related to the first) is that any U.S.
goal has to reflect the current science of climate change. More
specifically, the U.S. goal must reflect a scientifically defensible effort
to achieve the objective of the climate regime:
The ultimate objective of this [regime] . . . is to achieve . . .
stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at
a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference
with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a
time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to
climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened
and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable
34
manner.

31. See, e.g., Ko Hirano, Japan Eyes Proactive Climate Diplomacy in 2009, JAPAN TIMES
ONLINE, Dec. 17, 2008, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20081217a8.html.
32. See, e.g., NICHOLAS STERN, LONDON SCH. OF ECON. & POLITICAL SCI., KEY
ELEMENTS OF A GLOBAL DEAL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 5 (2008), available at http://
www.lse.ac.uk/collections/granthamInstitute/publications/KeyElementsOfAGlobalDeal_30Apr
08.pdf (calling on developed countries to reduce emissions by twenty to forty percent by 2020).
33. See G8 Ministers Compromise on 2050 Climate Target, EURACTIV.COM, May 26, 2008,
http://www.euractiv.com/en/climate-change/g8-ministers-compromise-2050-climatetarget/article-172669.
34. UNFCCC, supra note 4, art. 2.
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Most scientists now recommend deep cuts in current and future
emissions if we are to meet the UNFCCC objective.35 Although the
operating assumption in the climate negotiations for many years was
that carbon dioxide (CO2) concentrations could double from preindustrial times (to roughly 550 parts per million (ppm)), scientists
have been continually and dramatically dialing back that estimate.
Now, the leading U.S. climate scientist, NASA’s James Hansen,
suggests that to avoid the worst consequences of climate change we
need to stabilize atmospheric CO2 emissions at 350 ppm.36 Such a
level suggests even greater cuts than the eighty percent reduction
aimed for by 2050. The United States must be able to make credible
arguments that its long-term commitments are sufficient to avoid the
most serious climate consequences, or be prepared to aim for even
deeper cuts. As noted above, the Obama Administration’s decision
to tap top scientists for leadership positions in the Administration
suggests it will be responsive to climate science.
The third criterion, and the one that requires careful balancing
with the other two criteria, is that U.S. commitments must be in line
with what can politically be supported at home in the United States,
and particularly with what the U.S. Congress either passes or is likely
to pass in federal climate legislation. Consider the failed strategy
underlying the Clinton Administration’s negotiations of the Kyoto
Protocol. The Clinton Administration and its environmental allies
apparently believed that they could set strong carbon commitments
internationally and use those negotiations to gain the political support
37
at home to win Congressional ratification. Perhaps that could have
occurred had Al Gore become president, but even before the election
in 2000, the Protocol appeared to lack sufficient support in the U.S.
Senate.38 At best, the fight for Kyoto ratification was going to be a
long and difficult one, with an uncertain outcome.

35. See, e.g., James Hansen et al., Target Atmospheric CO2: Where Should Humanity Aim?,
2 OPEN ATMOSPHERIC SCI. J. 217, 226 (2008).
36. Id.
37. See Kathryn Harrison, The Road Not Taken: Climate Change Policy in Canada and the
United States, 7 GLOBAL ENVTL. POLITICS 92 (2007).
38. See, e.g., Byrd-Hagel Resolution, S. Res. 98, 105th Cong., 143 CONG. REC. S8138 (1997)
(enacted) (passing the resolution 95–0, and expressing the sense of the Senate that the United
States should not sign any protocol that would “(A) mandate new commitments to limit or
reduce greenhouse gas emissions for the Annex I Parties, unless the protocol or other
agreement also mandates new specific scheduled commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse
gas emissions for Developing Country Parties within the same compliance period, or (B) would
result in serious harm to the economy of the United States”).
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Much has changed in the ensuing decade, not the least of which
is that the current U.S. Congress has been debating serious climate
change legislation for several years and will debate cap-and-trade
legislation again early in the 2009 session.39 It is anyone’s guess
whether the Congress will be able to pass a comprehensive climate
change bill before the Copenhagen negotiations in December. If they
do, the U.S. legislation will likely form not only the floor, but also the
ceiling, for our commitments in the international negotiations. If the
Congress does not reach agreement, then one of the big challenges
for the Administration will be to correctly gauge what is possible
within the U.S. political setting. Even if legislation is not passed by
Copenhagen, the parameters of federal climate legislation should be
somewhat predictable and should allow the Obama Administration to
seek reduction targets from other countries in exchange for U.S.
commitments. In this context, the Administration’s own views will be
quite persuasive and its negotiating position can be used to send a
signal of seriousness both internationally to other parties and
domestically to the U.S. Congress. Nonetheless, without clear
direction from the Congress,40 U.S. negotiators will be forced either to
agree to commitments that are uncertain of becoming law in the
United States or seek a delay in the international negotiations.
The question of what can be sold to the U.S. Congress is also
related to what will be acceptable to the U.S. public, and here the
Administration faces a difficult framing challenge. President Obama
repeatedly framed his response to climate change as an economic
opportunity to retool the basis of our energy economy, to bring
decent “green-collar” jobs back home, and to stop shipping oil
41
revenues overseas. As part of the U.S. negotiating posture, the
Obama Administration needs to internationalize this “green-collar”

39. See, e.g., Ben Block, Growing Optimism for US Climate Change Bill, WORLDWATCH
INST., Jan. 30, 2009, http://www.worldwatch.org/node/6000; H. Josef Hebert, Waxman Promises
Quick Action on Climate Change, USATODAY.COM, Jan. 15, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/
weather/climate/globalwarming/2009-01-15-waxman-legislation_N.htm.
40. Draft climate bills proposed in Congress in 2008 varied widely in their caps and
commitments. See Pew Center on Global Climate Change, Economy-wide Cap-and-Trade
Proposals in the 110th Congress, http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/Chart-and-Graph120108.pdf (last visited Mar. 10, 2009) (summarizing major economy-wide cap-and-trade
legislation). The leading proposed bill in the 2009 Congress is the Waxman-Markey American
Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009. See American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009
(Discussion Draft), 111th Cong. (2009), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/
Press_111/20090331/acesa_discussiondraft.pdf.
41. Marla Dickerson, Why Obama’s Green Jobs Plan Might Work, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 4,
2009, at A1, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jan/04/business/fi-greenjobs4.
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jobs message and explain how others, particularly developing
countries, will benefit economically from the shift to a carbon-free
energy future.
As the economic crisis continues, however, the policy options
may shrink. The need for a massive economic stimulus package with
substantial public investments does offer an opportunity to catalyze
an energy transformation, but long-term climate goals will have to
compete with the need for short-term job creation. Moreover,
alternative energy cannot compete in the market with depressed oil
and gas prices, and the economic incentives for developing alternative
energy sources have diminished. At the same time, policy options
that tax or otherwise increase the costs of fossil fuels will be criticized
as dampening the chances of economic recovery.
III. LEVEL AND NATURE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRY
COMMITMENTS
Developing countries agreed under the Bali Action Plan to
negotiate commitments that are “measurable, reportable and
verifiable,” and supported by financial and technical assistance from
the Annex I countries.42 Developing countries’ agreement to
negotiate at least some commitments was an important and critical
piece of the Bali Action Plan, and is considered to be a major
concession.43 The Administration must recognize, however, that the
developing country commitments are unlikely to be in the same form
as those of industrialized countries. Developing countries are not
likely to accept an overall comprehensive cap on net greenhouse gas
emissions at this stage, nor should the United States demand such a
cap.
The developing country position is consistent with the overall
framework that all countries agreed to in the UNFCCC, particularly
44
the principles of equity and of common but differentiated
45
responsibilities that underlie the overall climate regime. These
principles are premised on the idea that developed countries would

42. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
43. See, e.g., Bali Action Plan, supra note 3, dec. 1/CP.13(b)(ii).
44. UNFCCC, supra note 4, art. 3, ¶ 1 (providing that “[t]he Parties should protect the
climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of
equity”).
45. See id. arts. 3, 4 (including the recognition that the Parties should participate in climate
change efforts in accordance with, and taking account of, “their common but differentiated
responsibilities and respective capabilities”).
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accept binding commitments first, and take real steps to address
climate change before developing countries would be asked to make
similar commitments. The U.S. denunciation of the Kyoto Protocol
and our failure to accept any binding commitments either
domestically or internationally have left not only the United States,
but all industrialized countries, in a weakened position to demand
greater commitments from the major emerging economies, such as
China, India, Brazil, and the other developing countries.
Although emerging economies such as China are often painted
as obstacles to the climate regime, these countries have good reasons
to participate and cooperate in the international climate regime.
First, developing countries were stunned by the 2007
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report that
clearly showed both that developing countries would be extremely
hard-hit by climate change and that their participation would be
necessary to resolve climate change.46 These findings of the IPCC
report have been described as “an intellectual tsunami” on
developing country policymakers, because it shows the inevitability of
the need to address climate change.47 Second, the climate change
regime obligates the North to transfer technology and financial
assistance to the South in furtherance of protecting the global climate
and promoting sustainable development.48 Participation in the regime
should provide significant benefits for developing countries. More
generally, the promise of a new energy economy premised on
decentralized, renewable energy offers significant benefits to many
developing countries that have not benefited from fossil fuel
development.
To be sure, not all developing countries are the same in the
climate system. China, which became the largest annual emitter of

46. Stephen H. Schneider et al., Assessing Key Vulnerabilities and the Risk from Climate
Change, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY.
CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP II TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 779, 791–92 (2007), available at http://
www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4-wg2-chapter19.pdf.
47. The reference to an “intellectual tsunami” was made by Christiana Figueres, UNFCCC
Clean Dev. Mechanism, Remarks at the American Society of International Law Panel: Beyond
Kyoto: Dilemmas of Climate Regulation and Equity (Apr. 10, 2008).
48. See UNFCCC, supra note 4, art. 4, ¶¶ 3–5; Juliet Eilperin, Report Says 2 Global
Programs to Curb Emissions Fall Short, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 2008, at A09, available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/12/05/AR2008120503327.html
(noting
that the executive secretary for the UNFCCC, Yvo de Boer, considers the clean development
mechanism to “represent one of the only incentives for developing countries to participate in
emissions reduction”).
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greenhouse gases in 2008,49 and other middle-income countries like
India and Brazil, are significant contributors to climate change as
their economies (and emissions) have grown at a double-digit pace
for more than a decade. Such countries may have both greater moral
responsibility and financial capability to address climate change than
less developed countries, for example those in sub-Saharan Africa or
small island-states affected most dramatically by climate change. The
inherent differences within developing countries are already
reflected, at least in principle, in the climate regime,50 and suggest the
need for divergent climate-related commitments. Differentiating
developing country commitments must be handled with sensitivity,
however, and cannot be seen as driven by the North. Divergent
commitments must emerge from a flexible approach that allows for
different national commitments.
This analysis suggests that the new Administration must be
flexible in what types of commitments it seeks from developing
countries. Developing countries can be expected, and indeed should
be required, to adopt binding policies and measures, and other types
of targets under the current regime. Rather than a comprehensive
cap on emissions like those imposed on Annex I countries,
commitments for China and other middle-income countries could
come in one of many forms:51 sector-specific targets requirements, for
example, efficiency targets for cement manufacturing or transport, or
52
renewable portfolio standards for the energy production sector;
action targets, requiring a certain amount of effort in reducing

49. See Roger Harrabin, China ‘Now Top Carbon Polluter’, BBC NEWS, Apr. 14, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7347638.stm (documenting that China’s greenhouse gas
emissions surpassed those of the United States and likely did so in 2006–2007, but that this state
of affairs was not reported due to underestimation of China’s emissions).
50. See, e.g., UNFCCC, supra note 4, art. 3, ¶ 2 (acknowledging that “[t]he specific needs
and special circumstances of developing country Parties, . . . especially developing country
Parties that would have to bear a disproportionate or abnormal burden under the Convention,
should be given full consideration”).
51. See, e.g., Robert A. Reinstein, A Possible Way Forward on Climate Change, 9
MITIGATION & ADAPTATION STRATEGIES FOR GLOBAL CHANGE 295, 295–309 (2004)
(suggesting that each developing country should be allowed to identify its own commitments
based on national circumstances).
52. See, e.g., Niklas Hohne & Christiam Ellermann, A Sectoral Approach and Technology
Transfer for the Cement Sector 1 (Ecofys, Working Paper, 2008), available at
www.bafu.admin.ch/klima/index.html?lang=en&download...JjKbNoKSn6A--.pdf; Stern, supra
note 32, at 16 (“The move from a project to a wholesale approach could take the form of sector
targets, or programmatic emission reduction objectives.”).
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emissions;53 or intensity targets that would require an increased
efficiency in the country’s energy use. Such commitments would meet
the Bali Action Plan’s requirements for being “measurable,
reportable and verifiable,” but would not necessarily cap overall
carbon emissions. In this way, developing countries would signal
their long-term commitment to a global partnership in addressing
climate change, and the regime would benefit from experimentation
with a diverse range of policies and measures.
Such a flexible approach would likely find favor with developing
countries, many of which are already beginning to propose specific
commitments they are willing to make—at least if financial and
technical assistance is made available. At the December 2008
negotiations in Poznan, for example, developing countries proposed a
wide range of commitments that were generally seen as a clear signal
that they are willing to take serious mitigation steps. Among the
proposals: China promised to reduce its energy intensity by twenty
percent by 2010; Brazil committed to cut its deforestation rate by
seventy percent by 2017 (resulting in a thirty to forty-five percent
reduction in the country’s GHG emissions); Mexico pledged to cut its
emissions by fifty percent by 2050; South Africa committed to
capping its GHG emissions by 2025 and working toward a decline
thereafter; and Kazakhstan announced a decision to join Annex I of
the Kyoto Protocol and reduce emissions to 1992 levels by 2012.54
These developing country pledges are premised on expanded
financing and technology coming from the industrialized countries,

53. Kevin Baumert & Donald Goldberg, Action Targets: A New Approach to International
Greenhouse Gas Controls, 5 CLIMATE POL’Y 567, 569 (2006).
54. Juliet Eilperin, Developing Nations Plan Emission Cuts, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 2008, at
A10,
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/12/11/
AR2008121103822.html; see also Raymond Colitt, Brazil Pledges to Cut Amazon Destruction in
Half,
REUTERS,
Dec.
1,
2008,
http://www.reuters.com/article/environmentNews/
idUSTRE4B04G420081201 (discussing Brazil’s commitment to decrease its deforestation rate);
Vanessa Gera, Mexico Pledges 50 Percent Cut in Greenhouse Gases, ABC NEWS, Dec. 11, 2008,
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=6439878 (discussing Mexico’s commitment to
reduce its emissions); Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Richest Nations Pledge to Halve Greenhouse Gas,
N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/09/
science/earth/09climate.html (discussing G-8 leaders’ commitment to cut greenhouse emissions
in half by 2050 and South Africa’s minister of environmental affairs’ being vocal about not
wanting to support efforts that result in a “regression from what is required to make meaningful
change”); Justin Gerdes, Poznan Edition, Week 2: CCC Councilor Steve Chu Looks to be Next
U.S. Energy Secretary, COPENHAGEN CLIMATE COUNCIL, Dec. 12, 2008, http://
www.copenhagenclimatecouncil.com/get-informed/news/poznan-edition-week-2-ccc-councillorsteve-chu-looks-to-be-next-u-s-energy-secretary.html (discussing the Mexican Environmental
Secretary’s statement regarding Mexico’s vow to halve emission rates).
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but nonetheless are serious proposals that increase pressure on the
United States and other Annex I countries to make stronger
commitments in the post-Kyoto period.
IV. FINANCIAL AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
A fundamental principle of the climate regime (as well as other
multilateral environmental agreements) is that the incremental costs
for developing countries to address climate change should be covered
by new and additional financial and technical assistance from
industrialized countries.55 Thus, financial and technical assistance to
address climate change should not diminish assistance aimed at
poverty alleviation or other humanitarian goals, particularly achieving
the Millennium Development Goals.56 The debate over financial
assistance—both the scale of assistance and the mechanisms for
delivering it—under the climate regime will prove critical to the
success of the future negotiations.
The scale of financial assistance required for developing
countries to mitigate and adapt to climate change is enormous. By
2015, for example, the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) estimates $86 billion per year will be needed just for
adaptation efforts in developing countries—i.e., just those steps
necessary to reduce the impacts from climate change.57 These figures
dwarf current financial assistance flows for climate change. In 2006,
donors to the Global Environment Facility (GEF)—ostensibly the
primary financial mechanism under the climate regime—pledged only
$3.13 billion to fund projects between 2006 and 2010.58 The World

55. See, e.g., UNFCCC, supra note 4, art. 4, ¶¶ 3–5, 7–10 (requiring developed countries,
inter alia, to provide financial resources and to transfer technology to developing countries to
assist them in meeting their obligations under the Convention, as well as mandating that
developed countries help developing countries meet the costs of adaptation to the adverse
effects of climate change).
56. See generally U.N. Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/2
(Sept. 18, 2000), available at http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.pdf (setting
forth eight goals regarding poverty, universal education, gender equality, child health, maternal
health, HIV/AIDS, environmental sustainability, and global partnership that have come to be
known as the “Millennium Development Goals”).
57. U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007–2008: FIGHTING
CLIMATE CHANGE 15 (2007), available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_20072008_
EN_Complete.pdf; see also U.N. Dev. Programme, US$86 Billion Needed Each Year to Avert
‘Adaptation Apartheid’, UNDP NEWSROOM, Dec. 11, 2007, http://content.undp.org/
go/newsroom/2007/december/bali-climate-adaptation-20071211.en.
58. Since 1991, GEF has contributed $8.26 billion in grants and has raised over $33.7 billion
in co-financing derived from other sources to fund approximately 2000 projects designed to
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Bank’s new and highly publicized Climate Investment Funds were
launched with $6 billion in pledges, meant to be paid out over a
59
period of several years. Not surprisingly, developing countries seek
substantially greater financial commitments in the future.
The debate over financial resources is not only about the amount
of money, but also about what mechanism should be used to deliver
the money. Developing countries are demanding the creation of a
new multilateral financial mechanism under the UNFCCC
60
institutional structure. Currently, the GEF is the primary financial
mechanism under the climate regime,61 but the World Bank may be
the more important funding institution for climate change. The
World Bank is an implementing agency for the GEF and administers
the GEF Trust Fund.62 In addition, the World Bank recently
launched its Climate Investment Funds to support mid-term
investments in climate-friendly projects and to facilitate the growth of
the global carbon market under the climate regime.63 Moreover, the
World Bank remains among the largest public financiers of projects
64
that contribute to climate change.
Developing countries question the governance structure of the
World Bank, which gives a disproportionate share of decision-making
authority to the donor governments. The GEF offers an arguably

yield global environmental benefits in 160 developing countries and countries with economies in
transition.
Global Environment Facility, What is the GEF?, http://www.gefweb.org/
interior_right.aspx?id=50#GEF%20Funding (last visited Mar. 13, 2009).
59. Press Release, World Bank, Climate Investment Funds: Countries Selected for
Governing Bodies (Oct. 17, 2008), available at http://go.worldbank.org/AVUF843NG0. The
World Bank’s Climate Investment Funds are comprised of two independent funds: the Clean
Technology Fund and the Strategic Climate Fund. For more information on the Clean
Technology Fund, see WORLD BANK, CLEAN TECHNOLOGY FUND (June 9, 2008), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCC/Resources/Clean_Technology_Fund_paper_June_9_
final.pdf. For more information on the Strategic Climate Fund, see WORLD BANK, STRATEGIC
CLIMATE FUND (June 3, 2008), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCC/
Resources/Strategic_Climate_Fund_final.pdf#Strategic_Climate_Fund.
60. See G77 & CHINA, PROPOSAL: FINANCIAL MECHANISM FOR MEETING FINANCIAL
COMMITMENTS UNDER THE CONVENTION 2 (Aug. 26, 2008), available at http://
unfccc.int/files/kyoto_protocol/application/pdf/g77_china_financing_1.pdf.
61. WORLD BANK, STRATEGIC CLIMATE FUND, supra note 59, ¶ 6.
62. GLOBAL ENV’T FACILITY, INSTRUMENT FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE
RESTRUCTURED GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY ¶ 8, at 13, ¶ 22, at 19 (2008), available at
http://thegef.org/uploadedFiles/GEF_Instrument_March08.pdf.
63. WORLD BANK, STRATEGIC CLIMATE FUND, supra note 59, ¶ 5.
64. See, e.g., infra note 69 and accompanying text.
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more democratic structure based on double-majority voting,65 but the
GEF’s effectiveness and independence in delivering aid has been
66
Developing
questioned, particularly by developing countries.
countries would prefer that the financial architecture for climate
change be more balanced and point to the recently established
Adaptation Fund Board as a model.67
Although the United States and other industrialized countries
rightly resist a proliferation of international financial mechanisms,
some good reasons exist to consider such a mechanism under the
UNFCCC. First, an independent mechanism controlled by the
Conference of the Parties has worked well in assisting developing
countries to reduce ozone depleting substances under the Montreal
68
Moreover, the World Bank and the GEF both have
Protocol.
significant negative factors—the World Bank does not enjoy
credibility among many environmentalists and the GEF is viewed as
bureaucratic and ineffective.69 Perhaps most importantly, the creation
of an independent financial mechanism with balanced representation
may be the key compromise necessary to ensure fuller participation
by developing countries.
The underlying conflict is that donor governments are unwilling
to give large sums of money to institutions over which they lack
control, ostensibly because they believe such accountability improves
the effectiveness of development aid. To be sure, significant
inefficiencies and bloated bureaucracies can reduce the effectiveness
of development aid, but there is little evidence that the World Bank
or other donor-controlled institutions are immune from these

65. PETER CHOWLA ET AL., BRIDGING THE DEMOCRATIC DEFICIT: DOUBLE MAJORITY
DECISION MAKING AND THE IMF 8 (2007), available at http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/
doc/wbimfgov/DoubleMajority_IMF.pdf.
66. See THOMAS GRIFFITHS, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT
FACILITY 14–17 (2005), available at http://www.forestpeoples.org/documents/ifi_igo/gef/
gef_study_jan05_eng.pdf.
67. See Adaptation Fund, supra note 11, dec. 1/CMP.3, ¶ 6 (describing the composition of
the Adaptation Fund Board).
68. For information on the Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal
Protocol, see http://www.multilateralfund.org (last visited Mar. 26, 2009).
69. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth Int’l, World Bank Still Fuelling Climate Change, Apr. 13,
2007, http://www.foei.org/en/media/archive/2007/world-bank-still-fuelling-climate-change; Janet
Redman, The World Bank’s Carbon Deals, FOREIGN POL’Y IN FOCUS, Apr. 10, 2008,
http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/5143; JANET REDMAN, SUSTAINABLE ENERGY & ECON. NETWORK,
WORLD BANK: CLIMATE PROFITEER (2008).
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complaints.70 The United States needs to engage in this dialogue and
be supportive of more flexible arrangements, where recipient
countries have greater buy-in at the project level because they have
more voice at the decision-making level.
The tension between donors and recipients has led to some
recent innovations in the climate context. The World Bank’s recently
created Climate Investment Funds (CIFs) are run by committees with
71
balanced representation between recipient and donor countries.
The $6 billion in CIFs are intended to provide interim funding for the
carbon market until the future climate financial architecture is
finalized.72 In the end, the CIF structure may simply have added a
bureaucratic layer to the decision-making, albeit one in which
developing countries have more control, because any project financed
by the CIF must still be approved by the underlying development
bank’s donor-dominated board of executive directors. In addition, as
noted above, recent negotiations establishing the Adaptation Fund
under the Kyoto Protocol resulted in an arguably more democratic
governance structure, with a governing board featuring relatively
more balanced North-South representation.73
The current global financial crisis shifts this discussion in ways
that are hard to predict, and the financial crisis will also create
climate-related challenges for the Administration. On the one hand,
the financial crisis will generally make less money available for
international climate assistance, thus expectations should be lowered
accordingly. On the other hand, the massive amounts of public
money put on the table for responding to the financial crisis (now
estimated to be up to $4 trillion) has moved the benchmark for what
is possible, raising expectations that the climate crisis deserves a
similarly massive investment over time.74
The same conflict over financial governance seen in the climate
context also permeates discussions for a comprehensive response to
the current global financial crisis. For example, the weakening
70. See, e.g., South Centre, The Administrative Costs of Climate Change Adaptation
Financing: The Global Environment Facility as an Operating Entity of the UNFCCC Financial
Mechanism, at 14–20, SC Doc. SC/GGDP/AN/ENV/4 (July 2008), available at http://
www.southcentre.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=673&Itemid=1
(criticizing the GEF’s administrative costs for operating two funds under the UNFCCC).
71. Press Release, World Bank, supra note 59.
72. Id.
73. See Adaptation Fund, supra note 11, dec. 1/CMP.3, ¶ 6.
74. See, e.g., Colin Barr, Bank Bailout Could Cost $4 Trillion, CNN MONEY.COM, Jan. 27,
2009, http://money.cnn.com/2009/01/27/news/bigger.bailout.fortune/.
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financial power of the G-8, in comparison to middle-income countries
like China and India, provides an opportunity for restructuring the
responsibilities and authorities in international financial institutions.
Calls to vest greater decision-making authority in major emerging
economies can be coupled with greater responsibility, including
perhaps even financial assistance, from those economies. The
instability that accompanies the financial crisis should be viewed as an
opportunity for experimenting with innovative financial mechanisms
and governance structures. Solutions found there that provide
greater voice to emerging economies may spill over to influencing the
future financial architecture in the climate context as well.
V. THE FUTURE OF THE CDM AND OTHER MARKET MECHANISMS
UNDER KYOTO
The Kyoto Protocol is premised on the establishment of an
overall cap for greenhouse gas emissions and the use of innovative
flexibility mechanisms to reduce the overall costs of emission
reductions.75 The resulting cap-and-trade system relies on the
development of an international carbon market to attract significant
private sector investments in projects that create carbon offsets.
Kyoto’s Annex I parties have designed their national systems in
accordance with this market-based approach. Most notably, the
European Union’s Emission Trading Scheme has created a regionwide carbon market aimed in part at meeting EU commitments under
the Kyoto Protocol.76 Similarly, state and regional initiatives in the
United States presume that a global carbon market will exist in the
77
future to provide lower cost supplies of emission reduction credits.

75. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 5, arts. 2–6.
76. See generally A. DENNY ELLERMAN & PAUL L. JOSKOW, PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL
CLIMATE CHANGE, THE EUROPEAN UNION’S EMISSIONS TRADING SYSTEM IN PERSPECTIVE
7–9 (2008), available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/EU-ETS-In-PerspectiveReport.pdf (discussing the development of the European Union carbon market).
77. See generally Jonas Monast, Integrating State, Regional, and Federal Greenhouse Gas
Markets: Options and Tradeoffs, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 329, 330–31 (2008) (noting the
increasing number of regional and state carbon markets, including the Regional Greenhouse
Gas Initiative (RGGI), Western Climate Initiative, and the Midwest Greenhouse Gas Accord).
For more on RGGI, which was the first mandatory market-based CO2 emissions reduction
program in the United States and includes ten signatory states, see Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative, About RGGI, http://www.rggi.org/about (last visited Mar. 22, 2009). For more on
carbon markets in California, see Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE Div. 25.5, §§ 38500–99 (West 2007); PETER HSIAO ET AL., THE GREAT GREEN
HOPE: CALIFORNIA CARBON TRADING FOR CLIMATE CHANGE IMPROVEMENTS (2008),
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Unless the Obama Administration has a very specific and detailed
alternative to propose, supporting the extension of the flexibility
mechanisms past Kyoto is virtually inevitable.
But, extending the Kyoto mechanisms into a new reporting
period is different than expanding them into all areas related to
climate change. To be sure, the market-based approach holds the
promise to secure substantial private sector funding needed to finance
a transformation to a green economy, but many environmentalists
fear that the Kyoto’s flexibility mechanisms are not providing climate
78
benefits. Serious questions exist regarding whether many projects
financed under the existing clean development mechanism (CDM),
79
for example, result in additional, long-term climate benefits. The
Obama Administration needs to support the enhancement of the
CDM and other market-based approaches, but must insist on rigorous
criteria that ensure measurable climate benefits.
Not all aspects of global climate regulation need to be forced into
the cap-and-trade formula. Some aspects may be better left on the
outside of the market-based system. The supply of carbon offsets can
and should be limited to those types of projects or programs that are
measurable and verifiable. Moreover, some substances or activities
may be advantageously addressed through direct regulation. A mixed
system that incorporates clear “policies and measures,” as
80
contemplated under Article 3 of the UNFCCC, should be used in
sectors that are not appropriate for the carbon offset market. Thus,
for example, the lack of clear methodologies for measuring and
compensating for carbon offsets from avoided deforestation and
degradation should not delay the international community from
making significant efforts to sustainably manage forests. The

available at http://www.mofo.com/news/updates/files/Great_Green_Hope.pdf (discussing the
cap-and-trade program under the statute).
78. See, e.g., Shankar Vedantam, Kyoto Credits System Aids the Rich, Some Say, WASH.
POST, Mar. 12, 2005, at A12, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/
articles/A28191-2005Mar11.html (noting environmentalists’ criticisms of Kyoto and the CDM).
Support for the emissions trading approach of the Kyoto Protocol is far from universal, and a
significant and vocal opposition movement—the climate justice movement—has emerged to try
to counter the dominance of emissions trading in the negotiations. See, e.g., Mobilization for
Climate Justice, A Call to Climate Action: We Stand at a Crossroads, http://
www.actforclimatejustice.org/ (last visited May 6, 2009).
79. See Vedantam, supra note 78.
80. See UNFCCC, supra note 4, art. 3, ¶ 3 (providing that Parties should pursue “policies
and measures” that should “take into account different socio-economic contexts, be
comprehensive, cover all relevant sources, sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases and
adaptation, and comprise all economic sectors”).
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regulation of black carbon or certain industrial gases may present
other opportunities to take significant, immediate steps to mitigate
climate change without including them in a carbon market.
We can see this approach in the 2007 decision to accelerate the
phase-out of hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs) under the Montreal
Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Substances that Deplete the
81
Designed to reverse the deterioration of the
Ozone Layer.
stratospheric ozone layer, the Montreal Protocol regime is widely
considered the most successful multilateral environmental
agreement.82 In accelerating the phase-out of HCFC production in
developing countries, the parties to the Montreal Protocol
acknowledged for the first time its potentially important role in
regulating greenhouse gas emissions. The accelerated phase-out of
HCFCs removes one of the most popular types of projects from the
Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism—namely, the
destruction of hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) created as a byproduct of
HCFC production.83 Although a disproportionate share of the
CDM’s current projects,84 HFC-destruction projects have been widely
criticized for providing few development benefits,85 distorting the
86
underlying market for the production of HCFCs, and flooding the
carbon market with an oversupply of cheap emission credits.87 The
revenue stream available from the destruction of HFCs was
88
subsidizing the growth of HCFC production in China and India. The

81. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 100-10, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol]; see also Press Release,
U.N. Env’t Programme, Combating Climate Change Given Big Confidence Boost in Canada
(Sept. 22, 2007), available at http://ozone.unep.org/Publications/PressReleaseFinal22Sept2007.pdf.
82. See generally STEPHEN O. ANDERSEN & K. MADHAVA SARMA, PROTECTING THE
OZONE LAYER (2002) (discussing the Montreal Protocol’s history and effectiveness).
83. See Hepeng Jia & Xiaohua Sun, Kyoto Less Lucrative for Chemical Industry,
CHEMISTRY WORLD, Jan. 25, 2008, http://www.rsc.org/chemistryworld/News/2008/January/
25010802.asp.
84. PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM
BACKGROUNDER 4 (2008).
85. See Anup Shah, Climate Change Flexibility Mechanisms, GLOBAL ISSUES,
http://www.globalissues.org/article/232/flexibility-mechanisms (last visited Feb. 18, 2009).
86. See Donald Kaniaru et al., Strengthening the Montreal Protocol: Insurance Against
Abrupt Climate Change, SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y, Winter 2007, at 3, 3–5, available at
http://www.wcl.american.edu/org/sustainabledevelopment/2007/07winter.pdf?rd=1;
Tillmann
Elliesen, Burning Money, MAG. FOR DEV. & COOPERATION, Feb. 2007, available at
http://www.inwent.org/E+Z/content/archive-eng/02-2007/tribune_art2.html.
87. See Kaniaru et al., supra note 86.
88. Elliesen, supra note 86.
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Montreal Protocol curtailed this subsidy and, in so doing, tightened
the future market for emission reduction credits under the Kyoto
Protocol regime.
The Obama Administration should look for similar opportunities
that can be peeled out of Kyoto’s market-based system and addressed
effectively in a more direct command-and-control regulatory
approach. Limited use of such policies and measures would not
undermine the overall carbon market or the fundamental cap-andtrade structure of the climate regime. Parties in the post-Kyoto
negotiations will simply adjust their caps going forward, if they need
89
to. Caps are negotiated in light of the underlying rules for trading
and offsets.
The key from a climate perspective should be to simplify the
carbon trading mechanisms and to ensure that the resulting market
operates effectively. Only credits that provide clearly verifiable and
additional benefits should be included, so that the market for
emissions is resulting in climate benefits. Moreover, the supply and
demand for carbon must be equated, and this becomes more difficult
if the market includes large sectors with inherently uncertain
marginal costs for supplying GHG reductions. Guessing wrong about
either the amount or costs of carbon offsets that will be made
available from avoided deforestation, for example, can undermine the
carbon market’s price incentives. If unexpectedly large amounts of
cheap carbon offsets (for example, from avoided deforestation or
destroyed HFCs) enter the market, then the price of carbon offsets
may crash and leave little incentive to take other steps to reduce
emissions—steps such as energy conservation or shifts toward
renewables that may be more central to the long-term transformation
of our energy economy. Maintaining some predictability and
consistency to the price of carbon may require shrinking the supply of
carbon offsets to those sectors that are themselves more predictable
and certain.

89. Just such calculus shaped the Kyoto Protocol negotiations. The United States was
willing to accept one cap if net emissions from certain forest activities were included in the
formula or a less restrictive cap if net forest emissions were not included. See GRUBB ET AL.,
supra note 7, at 79 (noting that during the Kyoto negotiations “[t]here [were] also strong
industrial pressures to include [forest] sinks, particularly in the United States, which conceded
that their inclusion could strengthen its stabilization offer by several percentage points”).
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VI. TREATMENT OF FORESTS UNDER THE CLIMATE REGIME
Forest and land use practices account for nearly twenty percent
of all net greenhouse gas emissions.90 As a result, improving forest
and agricultural practices is critical to addressing climate change. The
overall objective of the framework convention is written in terms of
stabilizing net greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere.91 In
this way, the framework convention embraces efforts both to reduce
sources of greenhouse gases and to enhance the effectiveness of sinks,
such as forests, in absorbing greenhouse gases from the atmosphere.
Despite the recognition that forests are an essential part of the
climate puzzle, the Kyoto Protocol addressed forests only in limited
ways. In particular, countries’ net emissions could be adjusted for net
emissions resulting only from afforestion, deforestation, and
reforestation.92 Left out of the Kyoto Protocol was any treatment of
sustainable forest management that avoids deforestation in the first
place. Leading up to the Bali negotiations, several developing
countries proposed that donor countries should pay developing
countries for “reducing emissions from deforestation and forest
degradation” (known as REDD).93
The Bali Action Plan subsequently endorsed, in general terms,
94
the need to promote overall forest conservation efforts. Currently,
support is growing for establishing some kind of structure for
developed countries to provide broad financial payments to heavily
forested developing countries, and, in turn, developing countries will
agree to protect and conserve their forests.95 The result could lead to

90. See Terry Barker et al., Technical Summary, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: MITIGATION.
CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP III TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 26, 27 (2007), available at http://
www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg3/ar4-wg3-ts.pdf.
91. See generally UNFCCC, supra note 4.
92. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 5, art. 3, ¶ 3.
93. See UNFCCC, Methods & Science, REDD, http://unfccc.int/methods_science/
redd/items/4531.php (last visited Feb. 18, 2009).
94. See Bali Action Plan, supra note 3, dec. 1/CP.13(b)(iii) (calling for enhanced
“national/international action on mitigation of climate change” with consideration of “[p]olicy
approaches and positive incentives on issues relating to reducing emissions from deforestation
and forest degradation in developing countries; and the role of conservation, sustainable
management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries”).
95. See, e.g., UNFCCC, Subsidiary Body for Sci. & Tech. Advice, Brazil: Brazilian
Perspective on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation, at 22–24, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/SBSTA/2007/MISC.2 (Mar. 2, 2007); UNFCCC, Subsidiary Body for Sci. and Tech.
Advice, Bolivia, Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in Developing Countries: Approaches
to Stimulate Action, at 14–16, U.N. Doc. FCCC/SBSTA/2007/MISC.2 (Mar. 2, 2007). See
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substantial financial flows from North to South, with the goal of
improving forest management in developing countries.
Critics of the proposal fear that large amounts of money flowing
into the forest sectors in most of these countries will not effectively
curb deforestation, and may in fact exacerbate problems if it increases
access to forests or disempowers traditional forest communities.96
The problem for many of these countries—which include countries
that face civil war, such as Congo, and countries that perennially
struggle to control illegal timber trade, such as Indonesia—are
significant and pervasive governance challenges that generally
undermine any efforts at sustainable forest management. The fear is
that more money will do little to fix the governance problems or to
reduce deforestation.
Questions also exist over how to measure and verify emissions
from avoided future deforestation. Countries must set national
baselines for deforestation so that changes can be measured over
time. A group of sixteen countries have volunteered to serve as pilot
projects under a World Bank initiative called the Forest Carbon
Partnership Facility.97
If countries meet certain criteria and
demonstrate that deforestation has slowed in their countries, then
they would be eligible to receive payments for the amount of carbon
emissions avoided by their improved forest management.98 One of
the difficulties is ensuring no leakage over time from the system (i.e.,
that deforestation and thus carbon emissions are not simply delayed a
few years).99 Others question the scientific basis for measuring the
carbon impacts of avoided deforestation.100

generally AMAZON INST. FOR ENVTL. RESEARCH & ENVTL. DEF., TROPICAL DEFORESTATION
AND CLIMATE CHANGE (Paulo Moutinho & Stephan Schwartzman eds., 2005), available at
http://www.edf.org/documents/4930_TropicalDeforestation_and_ClimateChange.pdf.
96. See, e.g., Press Release, Envtl. Def. Fund, On the Agenda: Tropical Deforestation—
Who Gets to Benefit from the Carbon Market?, available at http://www.edf.org/
documents/8896_EDF_Poznan_REDD.pdf (discussing compensation as a means to reduce
deforestation emissions).
97. See
Forest
Carbon
Partnership,
About
the
FCPF,
http://www.
forestcarbonpartnership.org/fcp/node/12 (last visited Mar. 7, 2009).
98. See WORLD BANK, FOREST CARBON PARTNERSHIP FACILITY INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM 15–18 (2008), available at http://wbcarbonfinance.org/docs/FCPF_
Info_Memo_06-13-08.pdf.
99. See Questions Loom Large as Bank Pushes Carbon Finance for Forest Protection,
BANK INFO. CTR., Oct. 7, 2007, http://www.bicusa.org/en/Article.3510.aspx.
100. See U.N. Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Apr. 21–May 2, 2008, Report on the
Seventh Session of the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, ¶¶ 44–45, U.N. Doc. E/2008/4,
E/C.19/2008/13 (reflecting the concerns of indigenous peoples about current REDD proposals).
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In addition to questioning the carbon “integrity” of REDD, nonclimate concerns also permeate the debate. Significant infusions of
international financing may simply empower national governments
more in their efforts to usurp property rights of traditional forest
communities. A form of “carbon colonialism” could further diminish
forest dwellers’ ability to control what happens to their forests.101 This
suggests that additional, non-climate conditions should be placed on
how REDD is implemented—yet references to any rights-based
approach to REDD were rejected in the recent Poznan
negotiations.102
The Obama Administration should embrace the concept and
goal of avoiding deforestation, as well as seek ways to financially
support countries that curb deforestation. If sufficient funding was
made available through assistance programs, it might not be
necessary, at least in the near term, to link efforts to avoid
deforestation to the carbon market. Particularly given difficulties in
measuring long-term deforestation trends and the resulting impact on
the carbon cycle, the United States should solicit specific
commitments from developing countries to take concrete steps to
curb deforestation, and the United States should be willing to help
pay for those steps. Over time, we could measure the impacts on the
climate system; and perhaps future avoided deforestation could be
used as an offset in the international carbon market established under
Kyoto. This would mean that, at least in the near term, private
financial flows from the offset market would not be available for
avoided deforestation. Public assistance would have to be used to
launch REDD and gain experience over time.
VII. INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE POLICY OUTSIDE THE KYOTO
REGIME
The United States should also assert leadership to address
climate change in other international fora. Climate change is too
important and pervasive a challenge to cabin off in one set of

101. See Press Release, Friends of the Earth Int’l, Climate Talks End Amidst Fears Over
Carbon Colonialism (Aug. 27, 2008), http://www.foei.org/en/media/archive/2008/climate-talksend-amidst-fears-over-carbon; The World Bank Forest Carbon Partnership Facility: REDDy or
Not, Here it Comes!, REDD MONITOR, Nov. 10, 2008, http://www.redd-monitor.org/
2008/11/10/the-world-bank-forest-carbon-partnership-facility-reddy-or-not-here-it-comes.
102. See Emily Brickell, World Wildlife Fund, REDD Negotiations (Nov. 12, 2008),
http://www.wwf.org.uk/what_we_do/tackling_climate_change/getting_a_global_deal/poznan_cli
mate_change_conference/index.cfm?uNewsID=2545.
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negotiations; going forward, climate change concerns must now
inform a wider range of U.S. foreign policy. For example, climate
change concerns should guide our foreign assistance, whether
bilateral or multilateral assistance, provided through such institutions
as the World Bank. The United States should curtail assistance, at
least to middle-income countries, for fossil fuel projects that
contribute significantly to climate change, particularly if those
countries continue to operate without binding commitments under
the climate regime.103 A different approach may be needed for those
developing countries that lack sufficient capital for meeting basic
energy needs through alternative energy sources, but the clear
presumption in all cases should be that U.S. assistance will be going
increasingly to renewables, conservation, and the long-term
transformation of the world’s energy economy. We should similarly
use our voice and vote at the World Bank and other international
financial institutions to promote clean energy in their portfolios as
well. The World Bank’s planned revision of its energy sector strategy
in 2010 provides a welcome opportunity to shift that institution’s
energy portfolio.
The United States should also look for specific public/private
partnerships that can be used to eliminate inefficient processes in
specific sectors. The Bush Administration’s focus on capturing
methane from landfills is a good example that has had significant
climate benefits.104 The United States, working bilaterally and with
U.S. companies, can help to transfer technologies and support the
shift to more efficient alternatives in developing countries. Regional
organizations, such as the Organization of American States (OAS),
could also be used more proactively to address climate change.
Climate change will heavily impact countries in this region,

103. See, e.g., End Oil Aid, Global Call to End Oil Aid, http://www.endoilaid.org/globalcall
(last visited Feb. 18, 2009). The United States should announce it will no longer provide
support for fossil fuel projects from either the Overseas Private Investment Corporation or the
US Export-Import Bank, and the U.S. Treasury should ensure that our executive directors use
their voice and vote to curtail funding of fossil fuel projects at the World Bank and other
multilateral development banks.
104. See generally U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Energy Star and Other Climate Protection
Partnerships 2006 Annual Report, 2006 E.P.A. ANN. REP. 2, available at http://
www.energystar.gov/ia/news/downloads/annual_report_2006.pdf; Thomas Kerr, Voluntary
Climate Change Efforts, in GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND US LAW 591, 591 (Michael
Gerrard ed., 2007).
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particularly Caribbean island-states, and climate change has attracted
increasing attention at the OAS.105
A clear example where this could lead to immediate and
significant climate benefits is the elimination of black carbon. Black
carbon, or soot, is a major health problem and a localized air
pollutant in much of South Asia and many other parts of the world.106
The technologies and methods for reducing black carbon are wellknown, but not well-distributed, throughout the globe. A major
initiative by the United States, with money and technical support to
reduce black carbon emissions from China, India, and other
developing nations, would be a classic win-win situation. Not only
would reducing black carbon result in significant climate benefits,107
but public health would also improve in many developing countries’
108
largest cities.
President Obama should also continue U.S. support for the
emerging use of the Montreal Protocol to address climate change. As
noted above, parties to the Montreal Protocol in 2007 accelerated the
phase-out of HCFCs in developing countries, in large part to address
109
This decision was the first binding international
climate change.
commitment by both developed and developing countries specifically
for the purpose of addressing climate change, and the decision could
result in GHG emissions reductions equivalent to sixteen billion

105. Org. of Am. States [OAS], Mainstreaming Adaptation to Climate Change, at 4–6 (Apr.
2002), available at http://www.oas.org/macc/Docs/MACC-BRO.pdf (discussing projects to adapt
to effects of global climate change).
106. Press Release, Nat’l Sci. Found., Black Carbon Transported from Asia Plays a Role in
Pacific Ocean Climate (Mar. 15, 2007), available at http://www.nsf.gov/news/
news_summ.jsp?cntn_id=108465.
107. Black carbon is now viewed as the second most important warming agent behind
carbon dioxide. Veerabhadran Ramanathan & Gregory Carmichael, Global and Regional
Climate Changes Due to Black Carbon, 1 NATURE GEOSCIENCE 221, 221 (2008).
108. See Lisa Raffensperger, Black Carbon Emerges as Main Contributor to Global
Warming, EARTHTRENDS, Mar. 30, 2008, http://earthtrends.wri.org/updates/node/295.
109. See Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer, Montreal, Can., Sept. 17–21, 2008, Report to the Nineteenth Meeting of the Parties
to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, dec. XIX/6, at 33–34, U.N.
Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro.19/7, available at http://ozone.unep.org/Meeting_Documents/mop/19mop/
MOP-19-7E.pdf (recording adjustments to the Montreal Protocol with regard to
hydrochlorofluorocarbons in Decision XIX/6); The Ozone Secretariat, 2007 Montreal
Adjustment on Production and Consumption of HCFCs, http://ozone.unep.org/
Ratification_status/2007_Montreal_adjustments_on_hcfcs.shtml (last visited Mar. 22, 2009)
(providing a comparison of the past hydrochlorofluorocarbons control commitments of nonArticle 5 Parties (developed countries) and Article 5 Parties (developing countries) with the
commitments contained in Decision XIX/6).
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metric tons of carbon dioxide emissions.110
Other similar
opportunities may be available in the future under the Montreal
111
Protocol or other regimes.

110. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Accelerated Phase-Out of Ozone-Depleting
HCFCs (Sept. 22, 2007), available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/sep/92598.htm
(“Assuming the adoption of substitute refrigerants that are commercially available today, with
this agreement, the world will avoid nearly 3,000 million metric tons of carbon dioxide
equivalent emissions into the atmosphere.”). Additionally, if countries develop and transition
to new refrigerants “not yet invented that have no global warming impact, this agreement will
enable the world to avoid as much as 16,000 million metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent
emissions into the atmosphere.” Id.
111. For example, the International Maritime Organization is considering standards to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions from bunker fuel used in international shipping. See
UNFCCC, Emissions Resulting from Fuel Used for International Transport: Aviation and
Marine “Bunker Fuels,” http://unfccc.int/methods_and_science/emissions_from_intl_transport/
items/1057.php (last visited Feb. 18, 2009). Under the Kyoto regime, emissions from
international maritime transport are reported separately as part of the national GHG
inventories of Parties, and are not subject to the limitation and reduction commitments of
Annex I Parties under the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol. See id.

